Our Lady of the Rosary
Or "Why Modernism Was So Successful?"
At 10:15 A.M. on Thursday, August 23rd, 1973 the Sveriges Kreditbank of Stockholm, Sweden was rocked by sub-machine gun fire.1 "The party has just begun," announced a 32 year old prison escapee named Jan-Erik Olsson. "The party," indeed, continued for some 131 hours, or five and a half days, as Olsson held four of the bank's employees hostage in an 11 by 47 foot vault until late in the evening of August 28th.
While the Sveriges Kreditbank robbery itself may not have been of world shattering importance, later interviews with the four hostages yielded surprising results -- results that have been confirmed in numerous other "hostage situations" in the years that followed. Even though the captives themselves were not able to explain it, they displayed a strange association with their captors, identifying with them while fearing those who sought to end their captivity. In some cases they later testified on behalf of or raised money for the legal defense of their captors. The Swedish location of the Sveriges Kreditbank gave its name to this mental aberration as "The Stockholm Syndrome."
Long-term psychological study of this and similar hostage situations has defined a fairly clear and characteristic set of symptoms for the Stockholm Syndrome:
The captives begin to identify with their captors. At least at first this is a defensive mechanism, based on the (often unconscious) idea that the captor will not hurt the captive if he is cooperative and even positively supportive. The captive seeks to win the favor of the captor in an almost childlike way.
The captive often realizes that action taken by his would-be rescuers is very likely to hurt him instead of obtaining his release. Attempts at rescue may turn a presently tolerable situation into a lethal one. If the bullets of the authorities don't get him, quite possibly those of the provoked captor will.
Long term captivity builds even stronger attachment to the captor as he becomes known as a human being with his own problems and aspirations. Particularly in political or ideological situations, longer captivity also allows the captive to become familiar with the captor's point of view and the history of his grievances against authority. He may come to believe that the captor's position is just.
The captive seeks to distance himself emotionally from the situation by denial that it is actually taking place. He fancies that "it is all a dream," or looses himself in excessive periods of sleep, or in delusions of being magically rescued. He may try to forget the situation by engaging in useless but time consuming "busy work." Depending on his degree of identification with the captor he may deny that the captor is at fault, holding that the would-be rescuers and their insistence on punishing the captor are really to blame for his situation.
If the captors are numerous the captives may identify with some and not with others. They may perceive a set of "good guys" and "bad guys" amongst their captors. The captors may make use of such perceptions to gain information or desired behavior from the captives by having the "good guys" gain the confidence of the captives and by the subtle threat of what the "good guys" will not be able to keep the "bad guys" from doing if the captives are uncooperative.
The captives may blame some of their captors and exonerate the others. Depending on which set they are able to identify with, they may hold that "their leaders forced them to do it," or conversely, that "their leaders don't know the terrible things they are doing."
Finally, it has been seen that captors too are influenced by the interaction of personalities. They are rarely able to retain their ruthlessness if they come into contact with and learn that their captives are also human beings with problems and aspirations. To this end, they may seek to isolate themselves from their captives. It goes without saying that they can never communicate their limitations to their captives; never admitting, for example, that the "explosives" they brandish are made of rubber instead of dynamite!
The Stockholm Syndrome may be the key to understanding the success of the New World Order in undermining the Catholic Church. Indeed, since the Stockholm hostage situation took place over ten years later it might be appropriate to call this set of symptoms the "Vatican II Syndrome." At Stockholm only a few people were effected for only a few days. The effects of Vatican II continue to this day and impress themselves on the entire civilized world.
On October 11th, 1962 the Modernists took the entirety of Christendom hostage without firing a shot. In response to the whispering of an unidentified voice into his ear, Pope John XXIII and his bishops -- not content to take the material wealth of the Church, began the elimination of Its Mass, Sacraments, Doctrine, and Morality -- triggering the greatest hostage crisis in history.
In retrospect, knowing what we now know about the Stockholm Syndrome, the reaction of the Catholic faithful was unfortunately predictable:
The captives began to identify with their captors. Unlike the Stockholm captives, most thought that wonderful new things were about to transpire. But, quickly enough, Catholics began to realize that precious things had been taken from them. It did not take long for them to begin a childlike flattery of their captors, hoping to borrow a few baubles back once in a while: "Oh, Holy Father, your New Mass is wonderful, but can't I just bury my mother with the real one -- just this once?"
The captives were led to believe that all efforts to liberate them would be worse than captivity. The very same thieves who were trying to steal their souls convinced many of them that resistance was a sin of the highest order. As captives they were to "pray, pay, and obey"2 -- with emphasis on the last two. The captors convincingly claimed that _they_ were the Church, and that anyone who tried to preserve the Sacraments, keep the Commandments, or believe the truth was somehow outside of It. (This is particularly ludicrous in light of the Second Vatican Council's teaching on religious liberty 3 and intercommunion with non-Catholics.4) The worst demon in the Conciliar pantheon is the priest who continues to practice his Catholic Faith, and who tries to communicate that Faith to those around him.
The Modernists' falsehood is highly successful, as they have retained the trappings of the Catholic Church -- Its wealth, buildings, vestments, and even something resembling the Mass -- and have taken their plunder only slowly, so that none of the captives would become alarmed enough to fight back. Again we see the Syndrome at work; the captives placate the captors in their smaller demands for fear that otherwise the ultimate demand will be made. The dummy explosive of "excommunication" is threatened to be detonated if the captives don't slowly surrender their souls voluntarily.
Long-term captivity built an even stronger attachment to the captor. The captive submitted his mind to thirty years of Sunday sermons (often on Saturday) preached by the captor. He gave his children over to the education of "Catholic" schools. He allowed his captor to "annul" his longterm marriage in order to "marry" an attractive divorcee (annulee?). He sought "permission" from his captor-confessor to practice birth control on one of the rare occasions that he confessed his sins. Imagine the lingering fear of the captive who dreads the possibility that his captor might annul his annulment, or cancel his "permission."
Just like the captive, the captor is found to be a human being . He is forced to go along for fear that he will lose his pension, or have to get a job for which he is unprepared, or have to cook his own meals if he were to repudiate the New Order.
Remember too that the captor is a philosopher by profession. He knows both Catholicism and Modernism well enough to make the latter seem like the former. Man, he says, must keep the _Seven_ Commandments.5 He misquotes Sacred Scripture and the Doctors of the Church to justify his existentialism,6 and demands for utopian socialism.7
True to the Stockholm paradigm, the captives deny the reality of their captivity. He tells himself, "this hasn't happened because it can't happen; the Church is indefectible." Or he goes to sleep, refusing to take critical account of the garbage published by the New Order; placing his faith in its propaganda. Or, perhaps, he does busy-work, engaging in one of the hundreds of new "ministries" of the conciliar church.
Denial extends to seeking magical escape from captivity through the services of various "visionaries" and "seers"; who either testify that nothing is wrong, that after nineteen centuries the Church is finally running as heaven wants it; or who advise patience, obedience, and doing nothing while awaiting divine intervention.
A perceived conflict between the "good" captors and the "bad" captors defines the permitted scope of discussion. Self professed "conservative" newspapers like "The Wanderer" or "The Remnant" hold out hope to those willing to obey their captors in return for an occasional Mass or a papal statement that abortion is wrong. Discussion of any real return to orthodoxy simply never takes place.
The captives reason that "the Pope wouldn't allow this if he knew about it," or "you can't blame the priest for what the bishop makes him do, "the bishop can't watch all of his priests all of the time." They try not to think too hard, for taken to its logical conclusion this would mean that nobody is to blame for the Church's unmitigated disaster.
And while claiming great solicitude and openness to his captives, the captor thoroughly insulates himself from them. Critical letters to the Pope or his bishops are never answered.
One last thing can be learned from experience with hostage situations. They don't go away until someone resists the captors. If no one resists the New Order and its One World Church the captivity will continue.